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Abstract
We analyze the eﬀect of investments in corporate social responsibility
(CSR) on workers’ motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game vari-
ant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of a ﬁrm’s proﬁt to a charity.
We are testing for CSR eﬀects by varying the possible share of proﬁts given
away. Additionally, we investigate the eﬀect of a mission match, i.e., a worker
preferring the same charity the ﬁrm is actually donating to. Our results show
that on average workers reciprocate investments into CSR with increased ef-
fort. A mission match does result in higher eﬀort, but only when investment
into CSR is high.
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been a topic of hot debate in economics,
not the least since a provocative New York Times article – Friedman (1970) – that
stated “the social responsibility of business is to increase its proﬁts”. Recently this
debate attracted increased attention from the perspective of market eﬃciency. Gov-
ernment regulation in the spirit of Pigou (1920) often fails to adequately address the
negative externalities caused by ﬁrms. As a response to this combination of market
and state redistribution failure CSR is proposed, that is, private ﬁrms engage vol-
untarily in costly eﬀorts to address environmental or social problems.1 These costly
CSR activities may be beneﬁcial to ﬁrms as they can have a positive eﬀect on the de-
cisions of socially-/environmentally-minded individuals consuming products of the
ﬁrm (see, Fisman et al. 2006, Ghosh and Shankar 2009, among others), investing
in (cf. Orlitzky et al. 2003), or working for the ﬁrm (see, for instance, Turban and
Greening 1997). In labor markets – the focus of our study – the argument in favor
of CSR is that ﬁrms’ CSR activities might attract more motivated workers which in
turn may lead to an increase of proﬁts (see, for instance, Brekke and Nyborg 2008).
However, little is known about the driving factors at the individual level. Do work-
ers react to CSR activities of a ﬁrm, possibly by increasing their eﬀort? A common
ﬁnding in recent behavioral principal agent theory (see Charness and Kuhn 2011,
for an overview) is that non-monetary incentives can motivate agents. Workers may
regard ﬁrms’ investment into CSR as such a non-monetary motivation, especially
if workers like the particular CSR acitivity, i.e., mission, of the ﬁrm. Besley and
Ghatak (2005) stress the importance of such matching missions in a principal agent
relationship and they theoretically show that missions can economize on the need
for high monetary incentives if workers subscribe to the ﬁrm’s mission. That is,
by investing into CSR ﬁrms may create non-monetary incentives that reduce moral
hazard, especially if the ﬁrm’s and workers’ missions match.
Hence, the aim of this paper is to shed more light on the individual decision
making of workers in response to ﬁrms’ CSR and a possible mission match. For
this purpose we set up an experimental design based on the gift exchange game (a
workhorse to analyze labor market settings, see Fehr et al. 1993, 1998, 2007, among
others) where ﬁrms set wages and then workers select their eﬀort level. CSR is
introduced into this experimental labor market as a certain share of total revenue
given to a third party, e.g., a good cause. In the experiment this CSR activity is
1They may also try to directly reduce or avoid altogether negative externalities of their business
activities. For general discussions of CSR, see for instance Baron (2007, 2008, 2009), Auld et al.
(2008), or Bénabou and Tirole (2010).
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CSR on ﬁrms and workers we set up 3 treatments that diﬀer in the extent of CSR
activity the ﬁrm can choose. The ﬁrst treatment (GEG) does not include any CSR
activity and serves as a baseline for our experimental labor market setting. CSR is
introduced in the second and third treatment in which ﬁrms can choose a share of
proﬁts given to charity (none, 10%, 20% and 30% in the CSR4 treatment; none and
10% in the CSR2 treatment). As Besley and Ghatak (2005) stress the importance of
matching mission preferences of principals and agents for the motivation of agents,
we elicit participants’ preferences for the ﬁve charitable organizations that are of-
fered. If the worker’s eﬀort translates into a donation to a cause that is perceived
as good (matching the mission preferences of the worker) a caring worker might be
inﬂuenced in a positive way and chooses a higher eﬀort level. In addition to the mere
extent of CSR activity we can thus study the role of matching mission/charity/cause
preferences on the decision making of workers.
The experimental data shows that there is an eﬀect of CSR activity on worker
motivation. The eﬀect depends not only on the introduction of CSR, but also on
its extent. Moreover, matching mission preferences matter, but only in combination
with a high level of CSR. It seems that ﬁrms need to be serious about their CSR
activity in order to achieve a motivating eﬀect of the mission match.
Previous studies of CSR activities have been either theoretical or empirical, based
on secondary data or survey responses (see citations above). Turban and Greening
(1997) combine secondary data from KLD Company Proﬁles3 with survey mea-
sures on the attractiveness of companies for students. They ﬁnd that organizations
utilizing CSR are more attractive to employees and might have a comparative ad-
vantage in attracting applicants. Frank (2004) using survey and Nyborg and Zhang
(2010) register data show that CSR is associated with lower wages. Individuals’
self-selection into sectors or organizations with a similar mission as their own is ana-
lyzed by Serra et al. (2010). Using a survey and experimental measure of pro-social
motivations for Ethiopian health professionals they ﬁnd that these can predict the
decision to work in the non-proﬁt sector. Moreover, pro-social workers earn less
in the non-proﬁt sector than their colleagues scoring lower on the measures of pro-
social motivation. An experimental exception in this line of literature is Tonin and
2It shall be noted that CSR activities are manifold. We focus on donations to charity for prac-
tical reasons. Auld et al. (2008) discuss seven CSR categories, including corporate philantrophy,
which is based on charitable giving by ﬁrms. Although they categorize corporate philantrophy as
one of the “old CSR” categories, it is still a valid CSR instrument used by ﬁrms.
3A database developed by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. which makes organizations’
Corporate Social Performance publicly available.
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however, not pro-social or mission motivations in a labor market. We are, to the
best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst analyzing eﬀects of CSR in a laboratory experiment.
Therefore, the design might serve as a useful tool to investigate individual decision
making when CSR aspects play a role.
Our main result – on average workers reciprocate not only higher wages but also
investments into CSR with increased eﬀort – also contributes to the principal agent
literature. It adds to the list of non-monetary incentives to motivate workers (besides
awards, concern for status, and communication, see List and Rasul 2011, Charness
and Kuhn 2011) that provide alternatives to the monetary incentives approach of
standard contract theory. The standard neoclassical labor market model assumes
rational and opportunistic workers. Workers’ eﬀort is usually non-contractible above
a minimum and the moral hazard problem arises. A principle in labor economics
is that (monetary) incentives matter. In contract theory a main question has been
how workers respond to incentives and whether those can alleviate the moral hazard
problem. Lazear (2000) theoretically and empirically shows under the assumption
of heterogeneous workers that average output under a linear piece rate scheme is
higher, or at least not lower, than under a ﬂat wage regime as for some workers the
increase in compensation oﬀsets their cost of eﬀort. In a natural ﬁeld experiment
Shearer (2004) tests and conﬁrms the theoretical result. However, with performance
pay a ratchet eﬀect may occur in which workers restrict their output anticipating
that ﬁrms will raise output requirements or wage cuts in response to higher output
levels. Charness et al. (2011) provide experimental evidence on the ratchet eﬀect in
a multi-period principal-agent setting in the absence of labor market competition.
In a ﬁxed wage regime neoclassical theory predicts that workers will exert minimum
eﬀort to fulﬁll the oﬀered contract. However, there is no uniform empirical support
for it. Employers often pay higher wages and workers exert more than the minimum
eﬀort level. Based on this observation the fair wage hypothesis (Akerlof 1982, 1984)
has been proposed and tested successfully in gift-exchange experiments (Fehr et al.
1993, 1998, 2007). Another strand of the literature analyzes non-monetary incen-
tives to motivate workers. One such example are status incentive schemes in which
workers receive a positional good, like an “employee of the month” title or plaque.
Moldovanu et al. (2007) and Besley and Ghatak (2008) theoretically analyzed the
motivational eﬀects of status incentives on workers in an organizational context.
In a recent ﬁeld experiment, Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) provide evidence on
the motivational eﬀects of status in labor relations as symbolic awards substantially
increase workers performance. Similarly, results of recent laboratory experiments
4
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reciprocity (Mittone and Ploner 2011, Gächter et al. forthcoming). Also cheap talk
communication has been found to have a positive eﬀect on behavior in principal-
agent situations. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) ﬁnd that non-binding pre-play
communication fosters trust and cooperation in a partnership experiment (a mini
trust game). Brandts and Cooper (2007) ﬁnd that communication (between man-
agers and workers) about the mutual beneﬁts of high eﬀort outperforms the positive
eﬀect of direct ﬁnancial incentives on performance. Our study complements the
existing non-monetary approaches to motivate workers and presents an alternative
way – honest/substantial investments into CSR – to alleviate the moral hazard in
principal agent settings.
Section 2 provides the theoretical background of our labor market setting. In
section 3 we describe the experimental design, all treatments, the experimental
protocol, and derive behavioral predictions. Our experimental results are presented
in section 4. Conclusions and discussion in section 5 round oﬀ the paper.
2 Theoretical Background
Our stylized labor market setting consists of risk-neutral principals, indexed j, and
risk-neutral agents (“worker”), indexed i. In order to gain proﬁts a principal needs
an agent to interact with, i.e. a workforce. The principal’s resulting proﬁt, , is an
increasing and concave function of the eﬀort, e, supplied by the agent at increas-
ing costs c(e), with c0(e) and c00(e) > 0. Eﬀort is not contractible. It is assumed
that the agent has no wealth and, hence, no possibility to put in a performance
bond, however, opportunity costs for accepting a wage oﬀer of c0 > 0. This implies
a limited-liability constraint and the agent needs every period, irrespective of per-
formance, at least a wage w  c0. Therefore, a moral hazard problem exists. It
is furthermore assumed that each principal has suﬃcient wealth v and wage oﬀers
are restricted to w  v such that a principal cannot make losses and loss aversion
is ruled out. Agents are assumed to be identical in their ability to work for any
principal and both, the principal and agent, can obtain an outside option of zero.
The interaction is sequential and one principal is matched with one agent at a
time. A principal proposes a wage w which the matched agent accepts or rejects.
If the agent rejects the oﬀer both, the principal and agent, receive their outside
option of zero. Otherwise the agent selects an eﬀort e 2 (0;1]. The chosen eﬀort
results in the principal’s proﬁt function of (e;w), with
@(e;w)
@e > 0,
@2(e;w)
@e  0 and
@(e;w)
@w > 0. Conditional on accepting the wage oﬀer, the agents payoﬀ is given by
5
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@yi(wj;ei)
@wj > 0 and
@yi(wj;ei)
@ei < 0. The solution for self-interested
agents payoﬀ maximization problem is to accept any wage oﬀer wj  c0 and exert
the minimum level of eﬀort ei = e > 0 possible. Rational principals will anticipate
the agents rational eﬀort choice and oﬀer the lowest possible wage which the agent
is likely to accepted, i.e., wj = w.
However, it has been previously shown that not all agents behave self-interested
and diﬀer in their inclination to reciprocate wages (cf. Fehr et al. 1993, 1998, 2007).
Agents may derive, for example, some non-pecuniary beneﬁt from reciprocating
wages, e.g., for behavior consistent with a working norm (cf. Akerlof 1982, 1984)
or reciprocating kind behavior (cf. Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).
Individual diﬀerences are captured by i(w) 2 [0;maxfc0(e)g], with 0
i(w)  0. If
i(w) = 0 agents behave fully self-interested. Thus, agent i’s individual utility
function including non-pecuniary beneﬁts of reciprocating wages and faced with a
wage oﬀer by principal j is described by UA
i (wj;c(ei);ei(i(wj))). Assuming additive
separability in all aspects of the utility function and
@UA
i ()
@ei(i(wj))  0, the agents
maximization problem can be described as:
max
ei
U
A
i (ei) = ei(i(w)) + w   c(ei)   c0 (1)
and results in the following ﬁrst order condition:
i(wj) = c
0(ei): (2)
Hence, if at least some agents reciprocate wage oﬀers, i.e., i(w) > 0, average
eﬀort levels are above the minimum and increase in wages. A principal expecting
some reciprocation might well be better oﬀ with respect to proﬁts by increasing the
wage oﬀer above the minimum as long as
@j()
@wj  0. Under the functional form of
j = (v   wj)ei(i(wj)), which is also used in the later described experiment, the
resulting FOC of the proﬁt maximization problem leads to a wage oﬀer of:
v  
ei(i(wj))
@ei(i(wj))
@wj
= w: (3)
Equation (3) shows that a principal expecting some reciprocation might be better oﬀ
with respect to proﬁts by increasing the wage oﬀer above the minimum and should
optimally do so as long as the inequality v  
ei(i(wj))
@ei(i(wj))
@wj
> w holds, otherwise the
optimal wage oﬀer corresponds to the minimum wage.
The introduction of CSR does not change the basic structure of the interaction.
CSR is captured by spending (i.e., donating) a certain share  2 [0;1] of the prin-
cipal’s proﬁt for a CSR activity. CSR does not aﬀect the agent’s payoﬀ, yet the
6
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total amount spent for CSR. The principal has to simultaneously decide on a wage
w and , the level of CSR activity.
Similar to diﬀerentiating agents according to their inclination to reciprocate
wages, we assume that principals and agents diﬀer with respect to their valuation
of supporting a “good” cause, i.e., the level of CSR activity (). Moreover, in line
with Besley and Ghatak (2005), CSR activities diﬀer in terms of their mission, e.g.,
supporting diﬀerent causes. Some principals and agents may value a particular mis-
sion over and above their monetary income they receive from the work relationship
and the valuation of CSR in general. In our basic model principals can choose a
particular mission from an exogenously given set of k available missions. There are
(k + 1)-types of principals and agents, labelled p 2 f0;:::;kg and a 2 f0;:::;kg,
respectively. This reﬂects the particular mission preference. Principals and agents
of type 0 have entirely monetary incentives, whereas all types (p > 0 and a > 0)
may have some non-pecuniary component or valuation of the mission, i.e., support-
ing a good cause. Therefore, the introduction of CSR does not change anything for
type 0 principals and agents, however, for all others. The utility for agents of type
0 depends positively on money and negatively on eﬀort. All other agents’ utility
additionally depends positively on the level of , which adds to the utility they re-
ceive by reciprocating wages. Moreover, if the agent’s mission (e.g. preferred cause)
and the principal’s mission match, agents are even more motivated and receive ad-
ditional utility 
 > 0 from exerting eﬀort (cf. Besley and Ghatak 2005). Therefore,
the agents utility function also depends on the particular principal type they are
matched with and can be summarized as follows:
U
A
ia =
8
> > > <
> > > :
eia(i(wj)) + wj   c(ei)   c0 if a = 0 and/or p = 0
eia(fia(p) + i(wj)) + wj   c(ei)   c0 8 a 2 f1;:::;kg;p 2 f1;:::;kg;a 6= p
eia((fia(p) + 
) + i(wj)) + wj   c(ei)   c0 8 a 2 f1;:::;kg;p 2 f1;:::;kg;a = p:
(4)
The function fi(p) captures the agents’ reaction to the principals’ chosen CSR
activity and is increasing in , i.e., f0
i() > 0, but not bound to zero, meaning that
fi(0) can well be negative. Maximizing the agent’s utility with respect to eﬀort leads
to the following ﬁrst order conditions:
@UA
ia
@eia
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
i(wj)   c0(ei) = 0 if a = 0 and/or p = 0
(fia(p) + i(wj))   c0(ei) = 0 8 a 2 f1;:::;kg;p 2 f1;:::;kg;a 6= p
((fia(p) + 
) + i(wj))   c0(ei) = 0 8 a 2 f1;:::;kg;p 2 f1;:::;kg;a = p:
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Equation (5) shows that if the agent and principal care for a mission in general, but
their missions do not match, the agent’s eﬀort is equal or higher than in the case
without any CSR activity if fia(p)  0. It additionally shows that a mission match
increases the agents’ eﬀort even more such that the eﬀort is higher than in the case
without a match.
As mentioned above the agent’s individual reaction function to the principal’s
chosen CSR activity, fi(), might not be bound to zero. Moreover, it might not be
individually ﬁxed and varies between diﬀerent scenarios an agent might face. Let
us consider two scenarios which only diﬀer in the possibilities for the principal to
engage in CSR activities, i.e., the set of  values the principal can choose from.
Scenario I captures a situation where no CSR is possible, i.e., the one without CSR
described at the beginning of this section. An example of this scenario can be the
merely for proﬁt oriented sector in which no agent expects any CSR activity and
therefore the agent’s reaction function fi() does not exist or is simply set to zero.
The other scenario II is the one described above in which principals can choose the
level of CSR activity. If agents know the principal’s possibilities to engage in CSR
and they care for supporting a good cause, a low level of CSR activity or the actual
decision not to engage in CSR might be punished by exerting less eﬀort. In such a
situation fi() is, although increasing in , negative for at least some low levels of
. Then, assuming the same agents in scenario I and II, the agents average chosen
eﬀort level for  = 0 will be lower in scenario II than scenario I.
Similar to agents, principals exhibiting other-regarding concerns might be inter-
ested in contributing to a good cause, captured in p(p) with 0
p(p) > 0. Besides
oﬀering higher wages – which, however, can be driven by reciprocal expectations –
choosing higher levels of CSR will satisfy other-regarding concerns. Additionally,
expecting that agents reciprocate higher levels of CSR, principals can choose their
CSR level strategically. If a positive correlation between the level of CSR and eﬀort
exists and is large enough, principals might even increase net proﬁts. Incorporating
principals’ other-regarding concerns can be captured in the following utility function:
U
P
jp =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(v   wj)ei if p = 0 and a = 0
(1   p)(v   wj)ei(fi(p)) if p = 0;a 2 f1;:::;kg
(1   p)(v   wj)ei + p(p) 8 p 2 f1;:::;kg and a = 0
(1   p)(v   wj)ei(fi(p)) + p(p) 8 p 2 f1;:::;kg anda 2 f1;:::;kg:
(6)
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() > (v w)e. Moreover, a principal of any type p 2 f0;:::;kg can strategically
increase proﬁts if the paired agent is of type a 2 f1;:::;ng and ei(fi()) > .
3 Experimental Design
In order to capture ﬁrms’ CSR activities we extend the basic gift exchange game to
a three player version and are thus able to compare our results to previously run
two player gift exchange experiments. In the following we describe the basic setting
and our treatments in some details.
3.1 General Setting
In the original game each ﬁrm interacts with one worker at a time. A ﬁrm proposes
a wage w, then its matched worker selects an eﬀort level e 2 [0;1]. Choosing an
eﬀort level e = 0 connotes a rejection of the oﬀer and both, the ﬁrm and the worker,
earn nothing. Otherwise, the chosen eﬀort e results in the ﬁrms’ proﬁt function
described by:
 = (v   w)e;
where v is an exogenously given redemption value. Wage oﬀers are restricted to
w  v to rule out any form of loss aversion by ﬁrms. Since eﬀort is costly, a worker’s
payoﬀ is described by:
y = w   c(e)   c0;
where c(e) represents increasing costs of eﬀort according to table 1 and c0 depicts
the worker’s opportunity costs of accepting a wage oﬀer. The chosen eﬀort scheme
is more ﬁne grained than in Fehr et al. (1998), to capture possible smaller changes
in response to the oﬀered wage and chosen CSR activity, described below.
Table 1: The agent‘s eﬀort cost function
e 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
c(e) 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6
e 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
c(e) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13.5 15 16.5 18
The introduction of CSR does not change the basic structure of the game. CSR
is captured by giving a certain share  of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt to a third receiving
9
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game. Firms have to simultaneously decide on a wage w and , the level of its
CSR activity. Then workers decide on their eﬀort. This modiﬁcation results in the
following payoﬀs for the three player gift exchange game:
• Principal:  = (1   )(v   w)e
• Agent: y = w   c(e)   c0
• Recipient: d = (v   w)e.
3.2 Treatments
In all treatments n ﬁrms and n workers trade for n periods. Each period a ﬁrm is
paired in a perfect stranger fashion with a diﬀerent worker to rule out any reputation
eﬀects within a pair. The variables v and c0 were ﬁxed throughout all treatments and
periods at v = 120 and c0 = 20, respectively. Moreover, wage oﬀers are restricted to
w 2 f20;30;:::;120g and the ﬁrms choice set of possible levels of CSR () serves
as the treatment variable. Everything concerning the game and actual parameters
is common knowledge.
The ﬁrst treatment (GEG) is based on the two player bilateral gift exchange
game without a third CSR receiving party. It is similar to the BGE treatment of
Fehr et al. (1998), however, with a modiﬁed eﬀort scheme (see table 1 above). After
each period subjects get information on the wage, eﬀort and the resulting payoﬀ.
The initial experiment run in Linz in 1993 is quite old and behavior might diﬀer
today and in another place.4 Results of GEG will serve as a robustness check of the
original study as well as a baseline for behavior in the CSR treatments.
Instead of having a third inactive player in the laboratory, the share of the ﬁrms
proﬁt is given to charity. All participants are asked to state their preferred char-
ity (they could choose from Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Caritas, Doctors
without Borders and Unicef) they would donate to before and after information on
the actual game. Moreover, they can state that they do not care to which charity
they donate as a sixth option.5 This procedure gives a clean preference for a char-
ity (ﬁrst question) and a possible strategic choice after they know the rules of the
4The actual experiment was run in 2010/11 in Jena.
5The question before and after participants know the game slightly diﬀer. Before they are asked
to which charity they would like to donate 10 Euro. After knowing the game they are asked to
which charity they want to donate money from the experiment. If the sixth option is chosen a
random draw at the end of the experiment determined one of the ﬁve charities, which is clearly
described in the instructions.
10
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ﬁxed throughout the course of the experiment. Besides keeping instructions and the
game as similar as possible between ﬁrms and workers, asking all participants for a
preference on the charities gives us the possibility to analyze the eﬀect of a mission
preference match, i.e., the ﬁrm and the worker prefer the same charity.
A third CSR receiving party is introduced in CSR4 as described above. In every
period ﬁrms oﬀer workers a wage w 2 f20;30;:::;120g and denote their CSR level
 2 f0;0:1;0:2;0:3g simultaneously. Workers get information on the oﬀered wage
w and decide for all possible levels of  on one screen, i.e., in the strategy method
(Selten 1967). After each period subjects are informed about the chosen wage, eﬀort
level and payoﬀ. Only ﬁrms are informed about their chosen CSR level.6
Going from GEG to CSR4 is the most realistic, however, changes two aspects at
the same time. CSR4 introduces not only CSR, but also various degrees of it. Thus,
we are able to detect whether introducing CSR has an eﬀect only in a situation in
which diﬀerent levels are possible. For workers, which in general value CSR, the
reaction to  <  is ambiguous. Although choosing 0 <  <  shows the ﬁrm’s
intention to engage in CSR, a worker might have preferences over the actual level
as well. Hence, workers may sanction ﬁrms setting  below their preferred level by
choosing an eﬀort lower or equal to the situation with  = 0 or no  as in GEG.
Similarly, subjects might see the CSR activity as categorial instead of increasing and
only take the highest  seriously. To control for such eﬀects and, moreover, simply
looking at the plain eﬀect of introducing the possibility for ﬁrms to donate a share
of proﬁts, we implemented an additional treatment: CSR2. CSR2 is the same as
CSR4, but the choice on  is limited to  2 f0;0:1g, providing an on/oﬀ-decision
only.
In all we set up three treatments, which are summarized in table 2.
3.3 Behavioral Predictions
Since eﬀort is not enforceable above the minimum of e = 0:1, accepted labor con-
tracts are incomplete. Consequently, assuming individuals to be self-interested, a
worker accepting a wage oﬀer will always choose the minimum eﬀort level, regardless
of any CSR activity. As wages are restricted to 20  w  120 a worker is at most
indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting an oﬀer. Assuming that a worker ac-
6Only ﬁrms know the actually chosen  to minimize educational eﬀects by workers, e.g., choosing
a very low eﬀort after being matched with a number of ﬁrms choosing a low level of CSR. Workers
can actually calculate the  from their payoﬀ, if they have discriminated in their choice between
the four levels of . However, it is not directly visible and therefore needs some eﬀort to ﬁgure out.
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GEG CSR4 CSR2
Baseline Strategy method Strategy method
 = 0  2 f0;0:1;0:2;0:3g  2 f0;0:1g
no feedback on  for workers no feedback on  for workers
cepts when being indiﬀerent, there will be no rejected wage oﬀers, i.e., e = 0 choices.
Firms anticipating that will consequently oﬀer the lowest possible wage and never
engage in any CSR activity. Hence, there will be no w > 20 and no  > 0.
However, a robust ﬁnding in previous gift-exchange games is that on average
ﬁrms do not behave self-interested (cf. Fehr et al. 1993, 1998, 2007). They oﬀer
signiﬁcantly higher wages than the minimum. Similarly, workers on average do not
behave in a purely selﬁsh way. They rather reciprocate higher wages with higher
eﬀort instead of choosing the minimum. We expect to ﬁnd a similar pattern in our
experiment.
Prediction 1: Wage oﬀers will be above the minimum of w = 20, and
there will be a positive correlation between wage and eﬀort.
A positive reaction of the worker to the introduction of CSR indicates their
interest in supporting a good cause. However, they might not only have a preference
for supporting a good cause as such but they may also care about the level of support.
Analogously to reciprocating higher wages, workers might reciprocate higher levels
of CSR ().
Prediction 2: There will be a positive correlation between the level of
CSR and eﬀort.
Firms exhibiting other-regarding concerns might be interested in contributing
to a good cause. Beside oﬀering higher wages – which, however, can be driven by
reciprocal expectations – choosing higher levels of CSR will satisfy other-regarding
concerns. Additionally, expecting that workers reciprocate higher levels of CSR,
ﬁrms can choose their CSR level strategically. If a positive correlation between the
level of CSR and eﬀort exists and is large enough, ﬁrms might even increase net
proﬁts.
Prediction 3: On average ﬁrms will choose a positive level of CSR.
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their mission and the ﬁrm’s mission match. In our setting missions are expressed
by the diﬀerent charities. Hence, if both, the worker and the ﬁrm, choose the
same charity their missions match. We expect that workers will make higher eﬀort
decisions when the missions match than when there is no mission match between
ﬁrm and worker.
Prediction 4: A mission match between the ﬁrm and the worker will lead
to higher eﬀort decisions compared to a mismatch.
CSR activity is not an option in our baseline treatment. In contrast, ﬁrms must
select a CSR level in treatments CSR2/CSR4 and workers must choose their eﬀort
for every possible CSR level. When a ﬁrm decides not to invest in CSR, workers’
eﬀort choices may be aﬀected by such clear intentions against CSR. Workers may
not only exert less eﬀort for  = 0 than for  > 0, but they may also exert less
eﬀort if  = 0 is chosen by the ﬁrm in an environment where it is known that CSR
investment is possible. Hence, a de facto equal CSR level would result in lower
eﬀort when the ﬁrm could have invested in CSR but decided not to compared to a
situation where there is no alternative.
Prediction 5: Average eﬀort will be higher in the GEG treatment than in
the CSR treatments when  = 0.
Finally, we test whether subjects might regard the CSR activity as categorial
instead of increasing. Only the highest  level may then be taken seriously. Our
treatment variation aims to shed light on this aspect. In CSR4  2 f0;0:1;0:2;0:3g,
while in CSR2 there is only a binary choice,  2 f0;0:1g, and the highest possible
CSR level is 0.1 compared to 0.3 in CSR4.
Prediction 6: Eﬀort decisions for  = 0:1 will be higher in CSR2 than
in CSR4.
3.4 Experimental Protocol
We ran 6 separate sessions, two for each of the three treatments. In total 180 partic-
ipants were recruited among students from various disciplines at the local university
using the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004). The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
After entering the computer laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena
participants received written instructions7 which described both roles. They are
7See the Appendix for translated materials of the CSR4 treatment.
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is common knowledge. Participants questions concerning the experiment were an-
swered privately. Once all questions have been answered participants had to answer
a few control questions. The experiment only started when all participants had
answered all control questions correctly.
In each session 30 participants were subdivided in two equally large groups –
workers and ﬁrms – playing the game for 15 periods with randomly matched partners
of the other group. Participants knew that they are not matched with a participant
twice.
Sessions lasted on average 90 minutes, including reading instructions, answering
control questions and payment. Average earnings were e10 with minimum e3.9 and
maximum e21.3, including e2.5 show-up fee.
In sessions with treatments including CSR, donations were made online directly
after the payment. In order to make donations credible, we asked in each session
2 participants to monitor the transaction after the experiment. All volunteering
participants got an additional e2.5.
4 Results
In line with previous gift-exchange experiments we ﬁnd strong evidence against
general self-interest among workers and ﬁrms. Average eﬀort levels are higher than
the Nash equilibrium (NE) based on pure self-interest would predict, and also wages
are on average signiﬁcantly higher than the NE level of w = 20. Like in previous gift-
exchange experiments we ﬁnd, on the aggregate level, a signiﬁcant correlation in all
treatments between the chosen eﬀort level of the worker and the oﬀered wage. There
seems to be a clear tendency to reciprocate among workers. Similarly conﬁrming
previous results ﬁrms oﬀer the minimum wage only in very few contracts (3.1%),
see ﬁgure 1 for the distribution of wages. They seem to anticipate that workers
reciprocate on average. Finally, some contracts (3.9%) got rejected by workers
(none when  > :1). The average wage oﬀer of rejected contracts is 29.44.
Result 1: Not all wages are at the minimum; wage and eﬀort are positively cor-
related.
The new feature of our gift-exchange design is the level of CSR, how much a ﬁrm
will donate to a charity. We ran two CSR treatments. In CSR2 ﬁrms had a binary
choice, that is  2 f0;0:1g, in CSR4 the range was extended to  2 f0;0:1;0:2;0:3g.
From the worker’s perspective increasing eﬀort has a strictly negative eﬀect on the
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 030Figure 1: Distribution of ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers
own material payoﬀ, while the ﬁrm beneﬁts due to the increased revenue and the
charity receives a donation. Does a positive CSR level nevertheless have any eﬀect
on worker’s eﬀort? Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the exerted eﬀort for the
four CSR levels, split by treatment. In both treatments workers exert more eﬀort,
the more a ﬁrm spends on CSR. The increases in eﬀort from one  level to the next
are all highly signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < :01). Besides a tendency
to reciprocate low/high wages with low/high eﬀort, workers appear to appreciate
the CSR activity of a ﬁrm by increasing their eﬀort.
Result 2: The level of CSR and workers’ eﬀort are positively correlated.
Table 3: Exerted eﬀort and the level of CSR activity
CSR4 CSR2
mean st. deviation mean st. deviation
 = 0 .193 .009 .229 .011
 = 0:1 .242 .01 .272 .012
 = 0:2 .270 .01
 = 0:3 .317 .011
Table 4 contains an overview of the ﬁrms’  choices. Many contracts are oﬀered
without CSR, but also for roughly half of all contracts the level of CSR activity was
greater than zero. It seems that on average ﬁrms anticipate that a positive CSR
level may be beneﬁcial to them.
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Table 4: Firms’ chosen level of CSR activity
CSR4 CSR2
 = 0 0.44 .57
 = 0:1 .35 .43
 = 0:2 .14
 = 0:3 .07
We allowed the CSR activity to be somewhat heterogenous by letting participants
select a favorite charity from ﬁve organizations. Whenever a worker had to choose
her eﬀort, the preferred organization of the ﬁrm (the one the ﬁrm will donate to) was
announced to the worker. Since Besley and Ghatak (2005) stress the importance of
matching mission preferences for the motivation of agents we now analyze, whether
a match – a worker prefers the same organization as the ﬁrm she just meets – leads
to any diﬀerences in behavior.
In our experiment participants were asked twice about their preferred charity.
Participants were ﬁrst asked about their charity preference before they read the
instructions. We asked a second time after they had read the instructions, but
before it was decided whether they play as ﬁrm or worker. This second choice was
used to determine to which charity one donates in case of being a ﬁrm. Thus, there
is some scope for a strategic adjustment of the charity selection in order to impress
workers, while the ﬁrst choice is ’innocent’. Hence, we use workers’ choices when
they were asked before having read the instructions and ﬁrms’ choices afterwards
to determine a match. Figure 2 shows which organizations participants selected (in
the ﬁrst question).
Overall, a match occurred 239 times in the 900 meetings between a ﬁrm and a
worker in the CSR treatments. Figure 3 shows the frequencies of a charity preference
match between ﬁrm and worker split by sessions.
Table 5 presents average eﬀort levels in treatment CSR4 for the four  levels
and whether a mission match occurred or not. When the ﬁrm decided to donate at
levels  = 0:1 or  = 0:2, the exerted eﬀort is signiﬁcantly higher in case of a match
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < :05). When the ﬁrm actually donates substantially to
the charity that the worker prefers, it seems that the mission match has a distinctly
positive eﬀect on the eﬀort decision of the worker. For  = 0:3 the diﬀerence in eﬀort
whether a match occurred or not is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.8 A panel
8In treatment CSR2 eﬀort levels for  = 0 are .22/.26 without/with match, and for  = 0:1
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peace (2), Caritas (3), Doctors without Borders (4) and Unicef (5)
regression that takes individual heterogeneity into account conﬁrms the relevance of
a mission match for high levels of CSR activity. Eﬀort at  = 0:3 is the dependent
variable, while the oﬀered wage and a dummy for the occurrence of a mission match
are independent variables. The match dummy is signiﬁcant at the 5%-level. Mission
match dummies are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for  < 0:3. It seems that
matching mission preferences do in fact matter, but only in combination with a high
level of CSR. Thus, prediction 4 ﬁnds only partial support in our experiment.
Result 4: A mission match leads to higher eﬀort, given the CSR level is high.
Table 5: Exerted eﬀort, level of CSR activity, and mission match in CSR4
no match (n = 332) match (n = 118)
mean st. deviation mean st. deviation
 = 0 .187 .011 .212 .018
 = 0:1 .235 .012 .263 .019
 = 0:2 .261 .012 .3 .019
 = 0:3 .3 .013 .367 .023
Do participants anticipate the eﬀect of matched mission preferences? Do they
understand that donating to charity is perceived as good by many workers? Clearly,
they are .26/.3 without/with match. The diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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erence one believes the others have. In such a case deviating from one’s own charity
preference could make sense. In CSR4 2 out of 60 participants changed their pre-
ferred charity, in CSR2 9 out of 60 made a change.9 It could well be that some
participants regarded the pick of a charity as strategically relevant after learning
the rules of the game and hence they made a change, but we only ﬁnd few cases.
Figure 3: Frequencies of a match of charity preferences between ﬁrm and worker
(Amnesty International (1), Greenpeace (2), Caritas (3), Doctors without Borders
(4) and Unicef (5))
Figure 4 shows the average eﬀort over periods when the CSR level is zero, split
by the treatments GEG, CSR2, and CSR4. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
eﬀort levels in the baseline when there is no mention of CSR (mean of .35, standard
deviation .012), and eﬀort levels for  = 0 in CSR2 (.229, .011, Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p < :01) and CSR4 (.193, .009, p < :01). We use a panel regression that
considers individual heterogeneity with eﬀort at  = 0 as the dependent variable
and the oﬀered wage and a dummy for the GEG treatment as independent variables.
The GEG dummy is signiﬁcant at the 1%-level conﬁrming that the introduction of
9Out of the 11 switchers 5 turn out to be ﬁrms, 6 workers. Overall, 5 had not picked a charity
when we ﬁrst asked, 3 had chosen Amnesty International, and 3 Caritas.
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eﬀect on workers’ eﬀort choices.
When workers are aware that ﬁrms could invest in CSR, workers seem to punish
ﬁrms if they nevertheless choose a low CSR level.
Result 5: Average eﬀort in the GEG treatment is signiﬁcantly higher than in the
CSR treatments when  = 0.
In order to test for diﬀerences between treatments CSR2 and CSR4 we again use
panel regressions with eﬀort at  = 0/ = 0:1 as the dependent variable and the
oﬀered wage and a dummy for treatment CSR2 as independent variables. For both
 = 0 and  = 0:1 the CSR2 treatment dummy is not signiﬁcant.
Contrary to prediction 6 subjects do not seem to regard the CSR activity as
categorial. For  = 0:1, the highest CSR level in CSR2 but the lowest positive level
in CSR4, average eﬀort is not statistically diﬀerent.
Figure 4: Average eﬀort over periods when  = 0
Having established a positive eﬀect of the existence and extent of CSR on the
eﬀort of workers in our experimental labor market, we now investigate the eﬀective-
ness of CSR as an instrument for ﬁrms. For this we check whether the increased
eﬀort and in turn higher revenue outweighs the ﬁrm’s investment into CSR. Table
6 provides the increase in eﬀort in comparison to the choice for  = 0 and the
corresponding cost for the respective CSR levels. Independent of CSR level and
treatment it appears that investing in CSR leads to an increase of average workers’
eﬀort, but these gains cannot oﬀset the actual costs.
Firms investing in CSR should learn over the sequence of play that CSR results
in costs instead of gains. Hence, if ﬁrms use the CSR instrument strategically we
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CSR4 CSR2
gain cost gain cost
 = 0 0 0 0 0
 = 0:1 .048 .1 .043 .1
 = 0:2 .076 .2
 = 0:3 .124 .3
should see a decline in the use of it over periods. Figure 5 shows that this is not
the case, ﬁrms’ investment in CSR is similar over the periods. Instead of a strategic
use this points to a general preference to support a good cause, although it is not
beneﬁcial with regards to monetary payoﬀs.
Figure 5: Mean choice of the CSR level over periods in CSR4 and CSR2
Figure 6 shows the average wage over periods in the treatments GEG (mean
over all periods: 63.13, standard deviation: .77), CSR2 (63.58, .98), and CSR4
(58.2, .84). There does not appear to be a time trend in the wages oﬀered. There
is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between wages oﬀered in CSR4 and wages in the baseline
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < :01) and CSR2 (p < :01). However, this diﬀerence is
not caused by ﬁrms who decided to invest in CSR (60.71, 1.09), but by ﬁrms who
chose  = 0 (55, 1.27). In CSR2 there is no diﬀerence between ﬁrms who chose
 = 0:1 (63.76, 1.41) and ﬁrms who chose  = 0 (63.44, 1.37). Apparently, ﬁrms
who invest in CSR do not try to compensate for these expenses by oﬀering lower
wages to workers.
As illustrated in table 6, eﬀort increases never make up more than 50% of the
costs of the CSR investment. Hence, in our setting the use of CSR does not seem to
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pay oﬀ for ﬁrms. However, this value must be regarded as a lower bound measure.
Due to the focus of our study on the labor market and the reaction of workers, we do
not take into account eﬀects of CSR activity on consumers and investors. These may
be positive enough to justify the investment costs of CSR, and in turn CSR activity
would be proﬁtable for companies. Of course, from a social welfare perspective CSR
activity is already beneﬁcial, if the CSR investment has an eﬃciency factor that
compensates for the gap between proﬁt increase through higher eﬀort and costs.
In our case the eﬃciency factor of the CSR investment would have to be higher
than .5 to make CSR activity socially eﬃcient. According to Charity Navigator
(http://www.charitynavigator.org/) 9 out of 10 evaluated charities spend at least
65% of their total functional expenses on programs and services.
Finally, we look at the individual level of our data. It turns out that a substantial
fraction of workers does actually behave in a very selﬁsh way. 11 out of 60 (only
treatments CSR2 and CSR4) workers put in the minimum eﬀort independent of the
oﬀered wage or the CSR level. Continuing our categorization of workers 38 out of
60 respond to higher wages by increasing their eﬀort (holding  constant). 26 of the
38 wage-reciprocating workers also respond to the ﬁrm’s CSR level by increasing
their eﬀort, while 12 only reciprocate wages. For 11 workers the eﬀort decision
is independent of the oﬀered wage, but instead they respond to the CSR level.
While some workers simply put in the minimum eﬀort (neither responding to a wage
increase nor an investment in CSR), a substantial amount of workers reciprocate not
only wages, but also CSR activities. See ﬁgure 7 (a) for the wage-eﬀort proﬁles of
workers in one session of treatment CSR4. The wage/ combinations selected by
ﬁrms over all periods are shown in ﬁgure 7 (b).
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(b) Wage/ choices of ﬁrms over periods
Figure 7: Individual level data (from one CSR4 session)
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What is the eﬀect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers’
motivation? The empirical analysis of CSR in the workplace has so far been mainly
based on secondary data. However, knowing individual responses to such programs is
important to increase the eﬀectiveness of CSR activities which are generally regarded
as a promising way to compensate occurring negative externalities. For this purpose
we have introduced CSR into an experimental labor market and our design provides
a tool to analyze the eﬀects of CSR not only in the aggregate but also on the
individual level. Investments into CSR are captured by donating a share of the
ﬁrms’ proﬁt to a self chosen charity. Therefore, we have extended the standard
bilateral gift exchange game to a three player version in which the third player is
the CSR investment receiving party. Our treatments varied the possible shares given
to charity from none (the bilateral gift exchange game) to two (0% or 10%) and four
(0%, 10%, 20% or 30%). As all players are asked to state their preferred charity, we
have been able to measure if preferences between the ﬁrm and the worker match.
Our results from the treatment without CSR are similar to previous two player
gift exchange experiments. Firms and workers behave far from being driven by pure
self-interest, as wages and eﬀort levels are on average higher than what the Nash
Equilibrium would predict. There is also a signiﬁcant correlation between wage
oﬀers and chosen eﬀort.
The introduction of a third CSR receiving party leads a substantial fraction of
workers (26 out of 60) to reciprocate not only wages, but also CSR activities, i.e.,
choosing more eﬀort the higher the level of CSR is. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that
workers react positively to a mission preference match as suggested by the work
of Besley and Ghatak (2005). If the ﬁrm and the worker prefer the same charity,
workers exert overall more eﬀort. However, this is mainly driven by situations in
which ﬁrms choose high CSR levels. This ﬁnding suggests that the eﬀect of a match
is not simply represented by the same preferred charity but also includes a preference
for the actual extent of the mission, e.g., the share of proﬁts given to charity.
On average workers choose less eﬀort in treatments with possible CSR invest-
ments (CSR2 and CSR4) when ﬁrms do not make use of it, than in a situation in
which CSR is not possible and not even mentioned (treatment GEG). This may be
an indication of workers’ preference for CSR. In an environment where it is known
that CSR investment is possible, workers’ expectations about the CSR level are
raised. No investment into CSR would disappoint them and they punish ﬁrms’ be-
havior. Such a reaction to behavior below expectations would be closely related to
the reference dependent preference theory by Köszegi and Rabin (2006). Another
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might be the use of the strategy method. Workers have to decide on more options
when faced with the possible CSR investments taken by ﬁrms. The bigger action
space in our CSR treatments might lead to more balanced decisions. In combination
with the disappointment eﬀect if the CSR level is rather low and expectations are
not fulﬁlled, workers’ eﬀort decisions could be shifted downwards for low CSR levels,
but not shifted upwards as a high CSR level is either taken for granted or a positive
surprise is treated diﬀerently than a disappointment.
Caution should be exercised when generalizing our conclusions. Since we have
analyzed CSR in a market with an equal portion of workers and ﬁrms it might
not adequately capture existing labor markets. Labor markets usually contain the
possibility of unemployment, i.e., an excess labor supply. On the other hand, ﬁrms
are heavily competing for the best workers on the market, which can be captured
in an excess demand for labor. It would be interesting to analyze eﬀects of CSR
on markets with excess supply or excess demand of labor. Since we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
heterogeneity among ﬁrms and workers with respect to CSR use and response, a
market that allows for sorting might lead to separating equilibria. These aspects
are not within the scope of this study and therefore remain for future research.
Moreover, labor contracts are not necessarily limited to short-term contracts only.
We have analyzed a situation in which contracts are negotiated anonymously on a
round by round basis, which rules out reputation eﬀects between ﬁrms and workers.
A lot of real world contracts are longer than just a period, though. It is not known
so far how investments into CSR translate into a long-term working relationship,
which promises to be another interesting aspect for future research.
With respect to the eﬀectiveness of the CSR activity used in this study, it is worth
noting that the experiment’s measure of roughly 50% is a lower bound. Firms’ social-
image concerns are only partly considered in our experiment. The interaction with
workers is just one channel through which CSR activities can be eﬀective. Previous
studies have shown that CSR can be beneﬁcial, if these have positive eﬀects on the
decisions of consumers (cf. Ghosh and Shankar 2009) or investors (cf. Orlitzky et al.
2003), respectively. Lastly, since there is also a recipient of the investment into CSR
who may beneﬁt substantially, CSR as an instrument might well lead to socially
eﬃcient outcomes.
In sum, our results show that on average workers react positively to CSR and
reciprocate higher CSR levels with higher eﬀort. Having a mission which matches
the mission of a worker motivates these workers to increase their eﬀort. Yet, only
when the level of support is high. This suggests that if ﬁrms have a mission, they
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Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment! In this experi-
ment you can earn a certain amount of money, which depends on your and the other
participants’ decisions in the experiment. It is therefore important that you
read the following instructions carefully.
Please note that these instructions are meant for you only and that you are not
allowed to exchange any information with the other participants. Similarly, during
the entire experiment it is not allowed to talk to the other participants. If you have
any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. We will answer your questions
individually. Please do not ask your question(s) aloud. It is very important that
you follow these rules, since otherwise we have to stop the experiment. Please also
turn oﬀ your mobile phones now.
General procedure
The experiment lasts about 75 minutes. Each decision will be explained again brieﬂy
on the screen. While you make decisions, the other participants also make decisions
which may inﬂuence your payoﬀ. During the experiment you can earn money. Your
payoﬀ will be calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and 1 ECU =
0.10 EURO. At the end of today’s experiment your earnings will be converted into
EURO and you are paid in cash. In addition, you will receive 2.50 Euro as a show-
up payment. Your payoﬀ from the experiment depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. However, only 3 of the 15 rounds will be chosen
randomly and you will be paid according to the payoﬀ from these rounds only.
After you have ﬁlled in a questionnaire the experiment will end and you will
receive your payoﬀ.
Again the procedure as an overview:
• Reading of the instructions, test questions (online)
• Decision situations
• Questionnaire
• Payoﬀ and end of the experiment
Details of the procedure
The experiment consists of 15 rounds. In each round two participants interact: a
company and an employee.
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1. The company sets a wage and a donation factor.
2. Next, the employee decides whether he/she accepts this oﬀer or not.
3. In case he/she accepts the oﬀer, he/she then decides on the eﬀort level.
The proﬁt of the company depends on
• the eﬀort level,
• the paid wages,
• and the donation factor.
The income of the employee depends on
• the received wage and
• the cost of eﬀort.
You will be informed whether you act in the role of the company or in the role of the
employee over the course of the experiment. The allocation of each role is executed
randomly and with equal probabilities. You will stay in the allocated role for the
whole experiment. Hence, it is very important that you familiarize yourself with
both roles.
In each round you are randomly and anonymously matched with another par-
ticipant of the experiment, that you have not interacted with before. The company’s
chosen wage applies only to the employee assigned to this company in this round.
Likewise, the employee’s decisions (accepting or rejecting the oﬀer and choosing an
eﬀort level following acceptance) only apply to the company that was assigned to
this employee in this round. At the end of each round the company will be informed
about the employee’s choices. There will be no information regarding the decisions
from previous rounds.
How you earn money during the experiment
Earnings as employee:
• If an employee rejects the oﬀered wage, he/she will earn nothing. A rejection
is expressed by entering 0 as the eﬀort level.
• In case of acceptance of the oﬀered wage the employee receives the oﬀered
amount. However, the ﬁxed travel expenses (20 ECU) and the cost of eﬀort
will be deducted from this wage ﬁrst.
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leads to costs according to the following table:
e 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
c(e) 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6
e 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
c(e) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13.5 15 16.5 18
• A value of 0.1 corresponds to very low eﬀort, a value of 0.2 is a slightly higher
eﬀort level and a value of 1 represents the maximum eﬀort level.
• The higher the chosen eﬀort the more proﬁtable the outcome for the company.
• The earnings of the employee are calculated according to the following formula:
Earnings of the employee = wage – cost of eﬀort – 20 ECU
• During the experiment the company can donate part of its proﬁt. This share
can be 0.0, 0.1, 0.2 or 0.3. The eﬀort level will be asked for each possible level
of the donation b, which the company can choose. For the earnings only the
actually chosen share of donation will be relevant.
• After each round you will receive information about the oﬀered wage, the
rendered eﬀort level and your earnings from this particular round.
Earnings as company:
• In each round each company receives a starting capital of 120 ECU. This can
be used for wage payments. In order to do so the company chooses a wage
between 20 and 120 ECU in intervals of 10 ECU. If, for example, the company
oﬀers a wage of 120 ECU, it will have no remaining ECU left. If, for example,
it oﬀers a wage of 20 ECU, it will have 100 ECU left.
• In case the oﬀered wage of a company is rejected, the company earns nothing.
This means, the starting capital remains unused and expires.
• In case the oﬀered wage of a company is accepted, the remaining ECU of
this company will be multiplied by the chosen eﬀort of its employee. This
corresponds to the proﬁt of the company.
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from the proﬁt of the company to an organization that will be chosen at the
beginning of the experiment. In doing so the company can set 0.0, 0.1, 0.2
or 0.3 as a value for b. The choice of the employee will be asked for all four
possible values of b afterwards. That is, the employee will be informed about
the oﬀered wage and the organization being donated to and will then make a
decision on the eﬀort level for all possible b.
Proﬁt of the company = (120 ECU – wage) * eﬀort
Earnings of the company = (1-b) * (120 ECU – wage) * eﬀort
• After each round you will receive information about the oﬀered wages, the
chosen donation share, the rendered eﬀort, the proﬁt, the donated amount
and your earnings from this particular round.
Your payoﬀ from the experiment (3 out of 15 rounds)
Your earnings from one round are calculated as presented above. For companies the
donated amount, according to the donation share to the chosen organization, will be
deducted from the proﬁt. The received contributions will be donated online under
the supervision of two participants after the experiment.
For your payoﬀ from the experiment only the earnings from three out of the 15
rounds are relevant. These rounds are chosen randomly at the end of the experi-
ment. The according payoﬀ will be paid to you in cash directly after the end of the
experiment, that is, after you completed the ﬁnal questionnaire.
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